Obesity and smoking: can we catch two birds with one tax? by Dragone, Davide et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obesity and smoking: can we catch 
two birds with one tax? 
 
 
Davide Dragone 
Francesco Manaresi 
Luca Savorelli 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°873 
 
 
Obesity and smoking: can we catch two birds with one tax?∗
Davide Dragone† Francesco Manaresi‡ Luca Savorelli§
March 26, 2013
Abstract
The debate on tobacco taxes and fat taxes often treats smoking and eating as inde-
pendent behaviors. However, since there exists medical and sociological evidence about
the interdependence between eating and smoking choices, antismoking policies may also
affect the obesity prevalence and fat taxes could influence smoking behavior. We address
this issue from a theoretical standpoint and propose a dynamic rational model where eat-
ing and smoking are simultaneous choices that jointly affect body weight and addiction
to smoking. Focusing on direct and cross price effects, we compare tobacco taxes and fat
taxes and we show that a single policy tool can reduce both smoking and body weight. In
particular, fat taxes can be more effective than tobacco taxes at simultaneously fighting
obesity and smoking.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a dynamic model where eating and smoking are interdependent
choices and we show under which conditions a single policy tool suffices to reduce both
smoking and obesity. Comparing taxes on tobacco and taxes on food, we show that the
latter can be more effective in simultaneously reducing obesity and smoking. This result has
important policy implications, as smoking and obesity are two major causes of preventable
death. In the United States, almost one out of four deaths is estimated to be due to tobacco
smoking or obesity, which also have a significant impact on the health care system, with yearly
medical expenses and related costs of about the magnitude of $117 billions for smoking and
$190 billions for obesity (Cawley and Meyerhoefer, 2012; Mokdad et al., 2004). Since both
produce externalities or, in case of time inconsistent choices, internalities (Chaloupka and
Warner, 2000; Evans et al., 1999; Gruber, 2001; Gruber and Ko˝szegi, 2001, 2004; Finkelstein
et al., 2004), national governments have tried to modify smoking and eating behavior through
the introduction of taxes, educational interventions, advertising campaigns, and the provision
of assistance and tutoring.
The evaluation of the effectiveness of these policies and the debate about the introduction
of new ones usually focus on their direct effects. For example, tobacco taxes are considered
to be effective if smoking prevalence in the population decreases, and the debate on imposing
taxes on energy-dense food (often called fat taxes) concentrates upon their expected effects
on obesity rates. This approach can be appropriate when the indirect effects of the policy
interventions are negligible. When considering smoking and obesity, however, this appears
not to be the case, as suggested by the medical and sociological literature showing that
smoking, eating behavior and body weight are interdependent and reciprocally influence each
other. Interestingly, in the United States average smoking prevalence has been constantly
decreasing in the last forty years (passing from 42% in 1965 to 20% in 2007, CDC, 2010)
while, in the same span of time, obesity rate has increased (from 12.8% to over 30%, Flegal et
al., 1998, 2012). This evidence has stimulated a lively research agenda which studies whether
the observed time-trends in smoking and obesity rates are the causal result of antismoking
campaigns, rather than just a suggestive correlation. The economic literature on this issue is
relatively recent and so far the empirical findings are mixed. In line with the common wisdom
and the medical evidence that nicotine boosts metabolism and reduces appetite, some studies
find that a raise in cigarette prices and in excises on tobacco increases average body mass
index (BMI) in the population (Chou et al., 2004; Rashad and Grossman, 2004; Rashad et
al., 2006; Baum, 2009). Other papers point to the opposite direction, finding that an increase
in cigarette prices decreases BMI (Gruber and Frakes, 2006; Courtemanche, 2009; Wehby and
Courtemanche, 2012; Dragone et al., 2013), which would instead support the conclusion that
smoking and obesity are complements, rather than substitutes.
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To interpret the empirical results and to guide future policy interventions, a theoretical
framework is needed; however, to the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical model
which treats smoking and eating behavior as joint interdependent choices. To address this
issue, in this paper we propose a dynamic model for understanding how smoking and eating
choices are jointly determined, and to provide novel testable predictions on the impact of
taxation on smoking and obesity. We exploit the results from a body of recent medical and
sociological literature, and we allow for two different pathways through which smoking, eating
behavior and body weight are related: individual preferences and the effect of smoking on
metabolism. The model is dynamic because smoking is addictive, and because body weight
and addiction to smoking build up over time (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Levy, 2002; Dragone,
2009). This allows to construct a theoretical benchmark featuring both interdependence
between goods consumed at different dates, as well as interdependence between different
goods consumed at the same date.
Using this dynamic framework, we identify which behavior is consistent with a forward-
looking rational agent and show that the demand for smoking can be partially imputed to
the demand for weight control. This result rationalizes the empirical finding that smoking
initiation is sometimes driven by the desire to reduce appetite and to control body weight
and, analogously, that fear of gaining body weight plays an important role in the decision to
quit smoking (Moran et al., 2004; Cawley et al., 2004; Cawley and Scholder, 2013). We also
show that a person can reach a healthy body weight and be not addicted to smoking, although
this is only one of the possible outcomes of the model. In general, less healthy outcomes can
emerge, including situations in which a person (optimally) smokes, is overweight and on a
diet, or smokes, is underweight and binges. Finally, focusing on a permanent price increase
we study the long-run demand for smoking, food consumption and body weight in order to
understand the effect of policy actions that affect the price of smoking and of food.
By studying the demand for food in a dynamic framework where individuals are concerned
about their body weight, we contribute to the debate on the introduction and effectiveness
of taxes on targeted types of food. Supported by the United Nations and by the World
Health Organization, some countries (notably, Denmark, Hungary, and France) have recently
introduced some forms of food taxation, although with controversial outcomes (Mytton et
al., 2012). Other countries, such as Ireland, Italy, Peru, the United Kingdom and the United
States are actively considering whether introducing fat taxes to reduce obesity rates. Despite
the fact that some policy actions have already been implemented, the theoretical literature
on the impact of fat taxes on body weight is surprisingly thin. In a recent contribution,
Yaniv et al. (2009) study how fat taxes and time constraints can affect obesity due to the
simultaneous interdependence between healthy and junk food, and physical exercise. Here we
consider a different perspective which focuses on the simultaneous interdependence between
eating and smoking choices, as well as on the intertemporal effects of individual behavior
3
on future utility and on the accumulation of body weight and addiction. To the best of our
knowledge, such a dynamic theoretical framework is missing in the literature, and this paper
is a first step to fill this gap.
By emphasizing the role of interdependencies between smoking and eating behavior, we
identify the critical conditions that determine whether a tax-based policy intervention may
produce undesirable trade-offs such as, e.g., a reduction in smoking prevalence but an increase
in obesity. Importantly we highlight the possibility for the policy-maker to ”catch two birds
with one tax”, i.e. the possibility for the policy maker to implement a single policy action
which curbs both smoking and obesity. This result provides a rationale for those empirical
papers emphasizing the role of antismoking policies in the reduction of obesity (Gruber and
Frakes, 2006; Courtemanche, 2009; Wehby and Courtemanche, 2012; Dragone et al., 2013),
and it opens the way to further research on policies that accomplish multiple goals with a
single policy tool.
Finally, we show that smoking and eating behavior asymmetrically react to changes in
prices. This is due to the fact that the metabolic effect of nicotine impacts on the accumu-
lation of body weight, while food consumption does not affect the accumulation of addiction
to smoking. This property implies that the policy implications of taxing tobacco and taxing
food can be very different in terms of individual behavior and outcomes. More specifically,
we find that fat taxes can be more effective than tobacco excises in simultaneously fighting
obesity and smoking. The intuition for this result is that an increase in cigarette prices curbs
tobacco consumption, but also reduces the ”dieting” effects of nicotine. As a consequence,
body weight decreases only if the reduction in smoking also leads to a strong reduction in
food intake that more than compensates for a slower metabolism. By contrast, increasing
the price of food reduces food consumption, and consequently body weight, which in turn
makes smoking less desirable as a dieting device.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the evidence on the
interdependence between smoking and eating behavior, and we present the theoretical litera-
ture on the taxation of addictive goods and on fat taxes. In section 3 we introduce the model
and we solve it. In section 4 we study the short- and long-run demand functions for smoking
and food consumption, and we compare the effects of taxing tobacco or food. Discussion and
final considerations are contained in section 5.
2 Literature review
Smoking and eating behavior can be interdependent through different avenues. A survey of
the literature suggests that smoking may affect body weight through two major non mu-
tually exclusive channels. The first one relies on the evidence that nicotine is an appetite
suppressor through the central nervous system (Mineur et al., 2011). This anorexic effect of
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nicotine would suggest that smoking has a satiating effect on food consumption. This is not
a general rule, however, because biological factors interact with individual preferences and
social factors. Indeed, smokers tend to crave for smoking more when they are eating than
in other situational correlates (Dunbar et al., 2010) and there exists a category of smokers
that accounts for about one fourth of the market, the so-called social smokers, who smoke
primarily in social contexts, such as in bars, parties, restaurants, celebrations and in pres-
ence of others (Debevec and Diamond, 2012; Schane et al., 2009). Contrary to the trend for
regular smokers, the proportion of social smokers is rising. Analyzing data from the 1996-
2001 Behavioral and Risk Factor Surveillance System, the U.S. Center for Disease Control
finds significant increases in the proportion of nondaily smokers among current smokers in
38 states (CDC, 2003). Social smoking is particularly prevalent among young people. In
a 2004 cross-sectional study of college students, Moran et al. (2004) classified 51% of the
sample of current smokers as social smokers. Moreover, heavy smokers are more likely to be
obese. Despite the anorexic effect of nicotine, this evidence thus suggests that overall com-
plementarity among smoking and eating behavior cannot be excluded (Chiolero et al., 2008),
and that the reciprocal reinforcement between smoking and eating behavior is channelled
through individual preferences, lifestyle choices and social factors such as peer-pressure and
the conviviality dimension of smoking and eating.
The second channel of interdependence between smoking and eating behavior is based on
the medical evidence that nicotine accelerates metabolism, which in turn increases caloric
consumption (Chiolero et al., 2008; Mineur et al., 2011). Consistent with this result, a
recurrent finding in the medical literature is that nicotine administration causes reduction
in body weight, and that increased body weight results after cessation of administration
(Donny et al., 2011). Interestingly, smoking is often reported to be used as a method for
weight control: smoking initiation among teenagers is motivated by concerns on body weight
(Moran et al., 2004) and, in a similar vein, some people refrain to quit smoking because they
fear post-cessation weight gain (Spring et al., 2009; Cawley and Scholder, 2013). A recent
study has shown that in the US 46% of girls and 30% of boys smoke to control weight and
that the demand for smoking can be partially derived from the demand for weight control
(Cawley and Scholder, 2013).
The above evidence and the negative correlation over time between smoking and obesity
prevalence have inspired the conjecture that, due to the interdependencies between eating and
smoking behavior, the obesity epidemic might have been fostered by antismoking policies.
Whether this is empirically the case, however, is controversial. Focusing on the effect of
increases in the prices of cigarettes, Chou et al. (2004), Rashad and Grossman (2004), Rashad
et al. (2006), Baum (2009) show that quitting smoking is associated with increased body
weight, while Gruber and Frakes (2006), Courtemanche (2009), Wehby and Courtemanche
(2012) arrive at the opposite conclusion. Using detailed clinical data on individual health,
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smoking, and dietary habits, in a companion paper (Dragone et al., 2013) we show that
increasing excise taxes on tobacco decreases body weight and caloric intake and improves the
quality of eaten food.
The effect of price increases for addictive goods has been addressed from a theoretical
stance since the seminal contribution by Becker and Murphy (1988). The main idea of rational
addiction is that current preferences for an addictive good can depend on past consumption of
that good. Becker and Murphy show that a decision-maker may rationally choose to become
addicted by trading-off the intertemporal benefits and costs of consuming the addictive good,
and that the demand for the addictive good decreases when its price increases. An important
policy implication of Becker and Murphy’s model is that, to reduce the consumption of the
addictive good, one should increase its price. This prescription has received much attention
both in the policy practice and in the literature, and there exists a large empirical consensus
on the aggregate effectiveness of interventions based on increasing the price of addictive
goods such as smoking, alcohol and heroin, among others. Similar theoretical predictions are
obtained by Gruber and Ko˝szegi (2001) in a rational addiction model with time-inconsistent
agents, and by Gul and Pesendorfer (2007), who develop a model where consumption of the
addictive good is a tempting choice that erodes self-control in future periods.
In the theoretical literature on obesity, the role of fat taxes on body weight has not been
explicitly addressed, yet. An exception is in Yaniv et al. (2009), who adopt a static approach
to show that fat taxes, while reducing junk-food consumption, may encourage the prepara-
tion of healthy meals. Since this requires time for cooking and shopping healthy-ingredients,
and time is constrained, less time for physical activity remains available and an increase,
rather than a decrease, in body weight can result. Even though the literature on fat taxes
is scarce, there exists a small, but growing literature which models eating behavior and its
dynamic effects on body weight. Rational eating models share many features of rational
addiction models: consumers are forward-looking and maximize intertemporal utility taking
into account that past choices affect current utility. In the context of eating behavior, food
consumption choices affect future body weight, which in turn affects future utility because
having an unhealthy body weight reduces the survival probability of the agent (Levy, 2002;
Dragone, 2009) or determines health losses (Dragone and Savorelli, 2012). When trading off
the current and future consequences of eating behavior, both being overweight and under-
weight can be rational outcomes, including apparently pathological situations where a person
is underweight and yet is on a diet, or is overweight and binges (Dragone and Savorelli, 2012).
In the next section we merge these literatures on rational addiction and rational eating con-
sidering eating and smoking as simultaneous and interdependent choices.
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3 A model of rational smoking and eating
Consider a representative agent whose utility function U (s, c, q, a, w) depends on smoking s,
food consumption c, a composite good q, past smoking experiences a, and body weight w. The
utility function U (·) is continuously differentiable, jointly concave, and with negative second
order derivatives Ucc, Uss, Uww, Uaa. In the rational addiction model by Becker and Murphy
(1988), an addictive good features reinforcement between past and current consumption,
and tolerance. Reinforcement implies that the marginal utility of consuming an addictive
good increases with past consumption of that good. As a consequence of reinforcement, the
more a person is addicted, the more she desires to consume the addictive good. Tolerance
means that utility from a given amount of consumption is lower when past consumption is
greater. Formally, the reinforcement property requires past smoking to increase the marginal
utility of current smoking (Usa > 0), and tolerance implies Ua ≤ 0 for a ≥ 0. Beside the
interdependence in consumption of the same good at different dates, we are also willing to
assume interdependence in consumption of two different goods at the same date. In particular,
based on the evidence reviewed in the previous section, we allow for current smoking to affect
the marginal utility of food consumption, as indicated by the mixed derivative Ucs. Moreover,
we allow for smoking to accelerate metabolism (due to the metabolic effect of nicotine), which
contributes to reduce the accumulation of body weight. Hence the evolution of body weight
w depends on past and current eating behavior, as well as on current smoking, so that
w˙(t) = g (c (t) , w (t) , s (t)) with gc ≥ 0 for c (t) ≥ 0, gw ≤ 0 for w (t) ≥ 0 and gs ≥ 0 for
s (t) ≥ 0 (subscripts denote partial derivatives). The variable a representing past smoking
experiences (addiction to smoking) evolves over time depending on current and past smoking
choices, a˙ (t) = f (s (t) , a (t)) , with fs ≥ 0 for s ≥ 0 and fa ≤ 0 for a ≥ 0.
Given the initial body weight w0, addiction to smoking a0 and wealth b0, the agent must
choose the path of food consumption, smoking and consumption of the composite good that
satisfies the following intertemporal problem:
max
s(t),c(t),q(t)
∫ T
0
e−ρt [U (c (t) , s (t) , w (t) , a (t) , q (t))] dt (1)
s.t. a˙ (t) = f (s (t) , a (t)) (2)
w˙(t) = g (c (t) , w (t) , s (t)) (3)
b˙ (t) = rb (t) +M − pcc (t)− pss (t)− q (t) (4)
a (0) = a0, w (0) = w0, b (0) = b0
c (t) ≥ 0, s (t) ≥ 0, q (t) ≥ 0
w (t) > 0, a (t) ≥ 0,
where ρ > 0 is the intertemporal discount rate, r is the market interest rate, M is the
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instantaneous wage of the agent and b (t) is the available wealth. The terms pc and ps
represent the market prices of food and smoking, while the price of the composite good is
normalized to one.
In the remainder of the paper, we will make some simplifying assumptions which do
not affect the main results, but make the exposition more tractable. We will focus on the
case where no saving nor borrowing is possible, which allows replacing the dynamic budget
constraint (4) with the static budget constraint M = pcc (t) + pss (t) + q (t) , and we will
consider the following quasi-linear specification for the utility function
U (s (t) , c (t) , a (t) , w (t)) + q (t) . (5)
This assumption rules out the existence of Giffen goods and implies that the composite good
is non satiating. As in the literature on rational addiction and on rational eating, we also
assume that the evolution of addiction to smoking and body weight follows a linear dynamics:
a˙ (t) = s (t)− δaa (t) , (6)
w˙(t) = c(t)− εs (t)− δww(t). (7)
The depreciation parameters δa, δw ∈ (0, 1) are exogenous and represent the rate of decay of
addiction to smoking and body weight respectively (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Levy, 2002;
Dragone, 2009). For expositional convenience, we set δa = δw = δ. The parameter ε ≥ 0
represents the metabolic channel through which smoking affects body weight (Filozof et al.,
2004; Chiolero et al., 2008).
Finally, we will assume that past smoking does not interact with the marginal utility
of current food consumption (Uac = 0), and that body weight does not interact with the
marginal utility of current and past smoking (Uws = Uwa = 0) nor with the marginal utility
of current food consumption (Ucw = 0).
1
3.1 The optimal solution
To solve the forward-looking maximization problem, construct the following current-value
Hamiltonian function (omitting the time index):
H = U (c, s, w, a) +M − pcc− pss+ µ (s− δa) + λ (c− εs− δw) ,
where µ and λ are the costate variables associated to a and w, respectively. They represent
the shadow value of body weight and past smoking experiences, i.e. how much the value of
1The assumption Ucw = 0 implies that food is not addictive, which allows focusing on a scenario where
smoking is the only addictive good. For a different approach considering multiple addictive goods, see Dragone
et al. (2012).
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the discounted optimal stream of utility changes when there is a marginal variation in body
weight and past smoking experiences.
Given joint concavity, the following conditions, together with the appropriate transversal-
ity conditions and equations (6) and (7), are necessary and sufficient for an internal solution:
Hc = 0⇔ Uc − pc = −λ (8)
Hs = 0⇔ Us − ps = −µ+ ελ (9)
µ˙ = (δ + ρ)µ− Ua (10)
λ˙ = (δ + ρ)λ− Uw. (11)
The first order conditions (8) and (9) simultaneously determine the optimal food consumption
and smoking choices at each point in time, given the current level of addiction and body weight
and their respective shadow values. Note that, in a dynamic framework, the optimal choice
of food consumption and smoking in general does not correspond to the satiating choice in
which Uc = Us = 0, nor to the solution of a boundedly rational agent that neglects how
her current eating and smoking choices are going to affect her future utility.2 This occurs
because in a forward-looking framework the agent takes into account the shadow prices of
addiction and body weight, and their evolution over time as a consequence of her smoking
and eating behavior.3 Accordingly, since food consumption only affects the determination
of body weight, condition (8) only depends on λ. Since nicotine can affect body weight by
accelerating the individual metabolism (as measured by ε), optimal smoking also depends on
body weight. For this reason both costate variables, λ and µ, appear in (9).
3.2 Long-run equilibrium
To determine the long-run dynamic properties of the optimal choices of the agent, we focus
on the steady state of the problem for T → ∞.4 Before describing the possible types of
steady state that are consistent with the model, we introduce some terminology. We say
the agent is overweight if Uw < 0 (the agent would increase her utility by decreasing body
weight) and, conversely, she is underweight if Uw > 0 (she would increase utility by increasing
body weight). Using the same logic, we say the agent is on a diet if Uc > 0 and is binging if
Uc < 0; analogously the agent is smoking less than she would like if Us > 0, and is smoking
more than she would like if Us < 0.
2The optimal solution for an agent with bounded rationality is reported in the Appendix
3On the contrary, for a boundedly rational agent the value of λ and µ is zero at all t.
4For a similar approach see Becker and Murphy (1988), Dockner and Feichtinger (1991), Levy (2002).
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Proposition 1 In steady state the following conditions hold,
Uw = (δ + ρ) (p
c − Uc) (12)
Ua = (δ + ρ) (p
s − Us) + εUw (13)
δwss = css − εsss (14)
δass = sss, (15)
where the superscript ss denotes the steady state.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Equation (12) shows the existence of a trade-off between marginal utility of eating and
marginal utility of body weight. Analogously, equation (13) shows the trade-off between the
marginal utility of smoking, the marginal harm of the addiction to smoking and the marginal
impact of smoking on body weight.5 The steady state body weight increases with food
consumption, and decreases with smoking (eq. 14), while steady state addiction to smoking
tracks the changes in steady state smoking (eq. 15).
Can an agent rationally converge to a stable situation where she is not addicted to smoking
and she has an optimal body weight (Ua = Uw = 0)? Yes, this is possible, although this
outcome can emerge only as a special case.6 In general, the following four types of steady
states associated to some addiction to smoking and to a non-optimal body weight can result:
(i) Being overweight and on a diet, and smoking more than the agent would like;
(ii) Being overweight and on a diet, and smoking less than the agent would like;
(iii) Being underweight and binging, and smoking less than the agent would like;
(iv) Being underweight and on a diet, and smoking less than the agent would like.
Outcome (i) can occur only when smoking has a metabolic effect on body weight (ε >
0). In such a case, smoking effectively acts as a dieting device which the agent uses to
reduce body weight. In particular, this outcome describes an overweight agent who is already
dieting, and that optimally smokes beyond satiation to try to maintain body weight under
control. This theoretical result is consistent with the evidence of those people who are
overweight and declare they initiated smoking, even if they recognized it is harmful, because
their dieting efforts were not successful enough to reduce their body weight (Cawley et al.,
5Alternatively, equation (12) can be expressed as a relation between the marginal utility of body weight
and the corresponding shadow value: Uw = (δ + ρ)λ. Hence, when an individual is overweight, in steady state
the shadow price λ is negative, and when she is underweight it is positive. Also equation (13) can be expressed
as a relation between the marginal harm of addiction to smoking, the shadow value of addiction to smoking
µ and the metabolic effect of smoking on body weight λ, Ua = (δ + ρ) (λ− εµ).
6If Uw = Ua = 0 when c˙ = s˙ = w˙ = a˙ = 0, conditions (12) and (13) imply that, in steady state,
Uc/Us = p
c/ps holds. Interestingly, this is the same condition characterizing the familiar static optimizing
condition under budget constraint. The reason is that, in this specific steady state, the shadow value of
addiction to smoking and body weight is nil (see 10 and 11).
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2004). Outcomes (ii) and (iii) describe the cases where an overweight agent stays on a diet
to avoid getting even more overweight (Levy, 2002, Dragone, 2009) or where an underweight
agent eats beyond satiation to avoid getting even more underweight (Dragone and Savorelli,
2012). Outcome (iv) describes the case where being on a diet despite being underweight is a
long-run equilibrium. Dragone and Savorelli (2012) show that such an outcome can possibly
occur in a scenario where there is social pressure to be thin. Here, instead, the result is due to
the fact that, if the price of food is high, the agent optimally substitutes the composite good
for food, and possibly ends up eating below the satiation level even if she is underweight.
Finally, note that smoking more than one would like is optimal only for an overweight agent,
as she would otherwise refrain to smoke up to satiation because addiction to smoking is
harmful (eq. 13).
4 The effect of prices on individual behavior
In this section we study the effect of prices on food consumption, body weight and smoking.
We first consider the effect of an increase in the price of smoking and the effect of an increase
in the price of food; then we use the results of the analysis to study the effectiveness of policy
actions aimed at directly affecting the cost of smoking (through, e.g. the introduction of
excise taxes on tobacco), or the cost of eating food (through, e.g. the introduction of taxes
on junk food).
For both cases we will determine short- and long-run effects. Short-run effects are com-
puted considering body weight and past addiction, and the corresponding shadow values,
as fixed. For the long-run price effects, we will focus on stable steady states.7 The results
will depend on the degree of interdependence among variables in the utility function and
on the dynamic evolution of the state variables. In particular, on the basis of the evidence
reviewed in the previous section, the demand responses will depend on three main factors.
The first one is the simultaneous interdependence between current food consumption and
current smoking. On the one hand, there is medical evidence showing that nicotine is an
appetite suppressor. On the other hand, sociological and psychological evidence suggests
that, depending on individual lifestyles, situational cues and peer effects, eating can increase
the desirability of smoking. When the first effect is dominant, we say that smoking has a
satiating effect on eating. Formally, this case is represented by Ucs being negative, i.e. the
marginal utility of food consumption decreases when smoking increases (and, conversely, the
marginal utility of food consumption increases when smoking decreases). When the second
effect is dominant, smoking has a reinforcing effect on eating. Formally, this case corresponds
to Ucs being positive. The second factor concerns the intertemporal dependence between past
and current smoking. Following the literature on rational addiction, we allow only for the
7The conditions characterizing stable steady states are reported in the Appendix.
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case where past smoking has a reinforcing effect on current smoking (Usa > 0). The third
factor concerns the metabolic effect of current smoking on body weight (ε ≥ 0). This form
of interaction does not directly affect preferences, as it is a pure dynamic effect that affects
the evolution of body weight. Hence, it is not taken into account by an agent that neglects
the future impact of her current choices, but it will play a major role for a forward looking
agent.
4.1 Increasing the price of smoking
We first focus on the direct effect of an increase in the price of smoking. The following applies:
Proposition 2 When the price of smoking increases, smoking decreases both in the short-
and in the long-run.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result above replicates a main finding in Becker and Murphy (1988): addicts do
respond to incentives, and they reduce the consumption of the addictive good when it becomes
more expensive, both in the short- and long-run. Novel results emerge when considering the
effects of an increase in the price of smoking on food consumption and body weight.
Proposition 3 When the price of smoking increases:
1. In the short-run food consumption decreases if Ucs > 0, and increases otherwise;
2. In the long-run
• Food consumption decreases if Ucs > σ1, and increases otherwise;
• Body weight decreases if Ucs > σ2, and increases otherwise;
where σ1 = εUww/ [δ (δ + ρ)] and σ2 = −εUcc/ (δ + ρ) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The instantaneous reaction of food consumption to the increased price of smoking only
depends on the interdependence between current smoking and eating. Accordingly, smoking
and food consumption are complements in the short-run if smoking reinforces eating; and
they are substitutes in the short-run if smoking has a satiating effect on food consumption.8
In the long-run the picture becomes more complex, as the role of smoking on metabolism,
of time preferences and of the rate of decay of addiction to smoking and body weight play a
critical role. In particular, three cases can occur (see Figure 1).
8Recall that only substitution effects are at work because, due to the quasi-linear utility specification, all
income effects are captured by changes in the demand for the composite good.
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Figure 1: Long run effects of an increase in the price of smoking on smoking, body weight
and food consumption.
When the reinforcing effect of smoking on food consumption is sufficiently strong (Ucs >
σ2), increasing the price of smoking reduces smoking, food consumption and body weight. In
other words, smoking, eating and body weight are complements in the long-run. This outcome
is consistent with recent empirical research suggesting that taxes on smoking have likely
determined a decrease in body weight (Courtemanche, 2009; Wehby and Courtemanche, 2012)
and in food intake (Dragone et al., 2013). Accordingly, antismoking policies not only have
reduced smoking prevalence in the population, but also obesity. If, instead, the satiating effect
of smoking is large enough (Ucs < σ1), food consumption and body weight are substitutes
for smoking in the long-run. This case requires a careful assessment by the policy maker,
because it preludes to the possibility that an antismoking policy, although effective in reducing
smoking, increases food consumption and body weight. In the intermediate case where the
intensity of the interdependence between current smoking and eating is mild (σ1 < Ucs < σ2),
antismoking policies may foster the obesity epidemic even if people reduce their food intake.
This result seems to fit the evidence of people who respond to antismoking policies by reducing
smoking and food consumption, and yet increase their body weight. The reason hinges on
the fact that smoking ”burns calories” by accelerating individual metabolism. By reducing
smoking, individual metabolism gets slower, which favours body weight accumulation. To
compensate for the slower metabolism and the increased body weight, food intake is reduced.
When the interdependence between smoking and food is mild (and possibly nil), however,
the reduction in food intake is not enough to compensate the metabolic effect of reduced
smoking, and body weight ultimately increases.
In the special case in which nicotine has no metabolic effect on body weight (ε = 0), then
σ1 = σ2 = 0, in which case the sign of the long-run reaction replicates the sign of the short-
run reaction and information on the interdependence between current smoking and eating is
sufficient to predict the effect of an increase in the price of smoking on food consumption and
body weight.
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4.2 Increasing the price of food
In this section we consider the effect of increasing the price of food on smoking, eating
behaviour and body weight. The following proposition confirms that the law of demand
holds also for food consumption.
Proposition 4 When the price of food increases, food consumption decreases both in the
short- and in the long-run.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When considering the cross price effects, the short- and long-run reaction of smoking to
changes in the price of consumption mirrors the reactions of food consumption to changes in
the price of smoking. Interestingly, as shown in the Proposition below, the response of body
weight to the price of smoking is different from the response to the price of food, due to the
fact that smoking accelerates individual metabolism and that smoking is addictive.
Proposition 5 When the price of food increases:
1. In the short-run smoking decreases if Ucs > 0, and increases otherwise;
2. In the long-run
• Smoking decreases if Ucs > σ1, and increases otherwise;
• Body weight decreases if Ucs < σ3, and increases otherwise;
where σ3 = − [(2δ + ρ)Usa + Uaa + δ (δ + ρ)Uss] / [δ (δ + ρ) ε] .
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Long run effects of an increase in the price of food on smoking, body weight
and food consumption.
Consider Figure 2, where we represent the cases described by the above Proposition.9
When the satiating effect of smoking on food consumption is large enough (Ucs < σ1), food
consumption and body weight are complements in the long-run, while food consumption and
smoking are substitutes. Hence in such a case the increase in the price of food is effective in
reducing obesity, but the agent optimally substitutes smoking for food, which implies that
the policy maker must carefully assess the trade-off between increased smoking and reduced
obesity. In the area on the right of the vertical line indicated by σ1, the reduction in food
intake is accompanied by a reduction in smoking. The intuitive reason is that the fat tax
directly discourages eating, which helps controlling body weight accumulation and reduces
the incentives to smoke for losing weight. The intensity of the reduction in smoking depends
on the intensity of Usa: the higher the reinforcing effect of past smoking on current smoking,
the higher the reduction in current smoking after an increase in the price of food. In the
area above the σ3 line, the reduction in smoking is large, and the consequent slowing down
of metabolism offsets the reduction in food intake. Hence, after an increase in the price
9In Figure 2 we consider the case where stability of the steady state requires |J | > 0 and where all thresholds
σ1, σ2 and σ3 are feasible.
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of food, the agent reduces food intake and smoking, and yet her body weight increases.
The area below the σ3 line, instead, denotes the case where smoking is not very addictive.
Consequently, although smoking is reduced, the effect on individual metabolism is dominated
by the reduced food intake. This implies that, after an increase in the price of food, the agent
will reduce eating, she will get thinner and she will also reduce smoking.
The latter result is interesting for two reasons. First, it highlights a possibility that does
not appear to have been fully considered in the debate on eating policies against obesity,
namely the possibility of implementing eating policies that contribute to reduce the smok-
ing prevalence. In particular, this result is most relevant for those people who initiate and
continue smoking because they are concerned about being overweight, in which case imple-
menting policies that directly impact on food consumption and body weight would also make
smoking less attractive. Second, there is an important asymmetry between the response of
body weight to an increase in the price of smoking and an increase in the price of food con-
sumption. While in both cases there is the possibility that smoking, food consumption and
body weight are complements, when considering the price of food this outcome can occur in
a larger set of cases: when smoking reinforces food consumption, when it has a mild satiating
effect, and even when preferences for current smoking are independent from current eating.
Although it is questionable whether focusing only on body weight and BMI provides enough
information on the health condition of the agent, policy makers and institutions such as
the World Health Organization are explicitly concerned about fat accumulation as a risk to
health, and the corresponding campaigns are aimed at reducing obesity. Hence, identifying
different effects on obesity prevalence as a response to different policy tools is of particular
interest because it opens to the possibility of comparing the effectiveness of antismoking and
antiobesity policies, as we do in next section.
4.3 Taxing tobacco or taxing junk food?
In this section we exploit the previously obtained results to compare the effectiveness of
antismoking and antiobesity interventions. Our interest is on those policies that either raise
the monetary cost of smoking (such as the introduction of excise taxes on tobacco) or the
cost of food, everything else equal. Interpreting food consumption as a basket of different
types of food, the latter case includes scenarios where taxes are imposed only on specific
foods, as it is the case of fat taxes on junk food (energy-dense food, soft drinks etc.), raising
the overall price of the basket. Based on the results contained in Propositions 2, 3, 4 and 5,
the following holds:
Proposition 6 Fat taxes can be more effective than tobacco taxes to simultaneously fight
obesity and smoking.
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The above Proposition highlights the fact that, although it is possible for the policy maker
to reduce both obesity and smoking by using either tobacco taxes or fat taxes (provided there
exists some interdependence among smoking and food consumption), their effect on body
weight is not symmetric. By increasing the price of food, body weight and smoking decrease
when current smoking and eating are either reinforcing or independent, or even when there is
a mild satiating effect of smoking on eating (graphically, these cases correspond to the area
on the right of σ1 and below the σ3 line, see Figure 2). When increasing the price of smoking,
the same result can be obtained only if smoking is sufficiently reinforcing (area on the right
of the σ2 line). The result in Proposition 6 rests on the observation that the former region
includes the latter one, which implies that the set of cases in which fat taxes determine a
reduction in both smoking and obesity is (weakly) larger than the set where tobacco taxes
accomplish the same goals.
The possibility of identifying a policy tool that reduces long-run obesity and smoking in
a large range of cases is a relevant result because both smoking and obesity are major is-
sues in the agenda of health authorities, due to the associated health risks (see, for example,
WHO, 2000), to the production of externalities (both in terms of health, and in terms of
hospitalization costs and medical care), and to the possible existence of internalities created
by self-control problems. Since implementing a policy intervention is costly, showing that
there exist differences in the effectiveness of policy actions provides information on which
intervention is more desirable. In particular, the role of a dynamic framework must be em-
phasized, as the relative advantages of the two tools emerge from explicit consideration of
the interdependence between different goods consumed at the same date, of the interdepen-
dence between the same good consumed at different dates, and on the interdependence in
the evolution of body weight. In this direction, the above result allows to understand the
variables that crucially determine the conditions under which no trade-off between smoking
and obesity emerges, and it may provide a useful tool for guiding future policy interventions.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a dynamic model to jointly study the interaction between
smoking and eating behavior over time, and to understand the conditions under which taxa-
tion aimed at affecting one health-related behavior may have a different scope than expected.
We exploited the available medical and sociological evidence to support the assumption that
smoking and eating behaviors are interdependent, either in terms of preferences or because
they affect individual metabolism, and we have shown the trade-offs that characterize the
rational behavior of a forward-looking agent. Consistent with the empirical evidence, we
have found that a variety of stable eating and smoking outcomes may emerge, including clus-
ters of unhealthy behaviors leading to being overweight and addicted to smoking, or being
underweight and on a diet.
By emphasizing the role of interdependencies between different health-related behaviors,
we show that targeting single health-related behaviors as if there were no interdependence
with other behaviors can have a different scope than expected. This, however, is not nec-
essarily bad news. Although it is possible for antismoking policies (or antiobesity policies)
to backfire, there are conditions under which a single policy tool, such as the introduction
of excises on tobacco, suffices to induce an overall health improvement by jointly reducing
smoking and obesity rates in the population. In the latter case, the policy maker hits ”two
birds with one stone”. We further studied whether taxing food provides any comparative
advantage with respect to taxing cigarettes. We indeed found that the set of cases in which
this two-for-one result is obtainable is larger when increasing the price of food than when
increasing the price of smoking. This suggests that taxation of junk food may jointly reduce
smoking and obesity prevalence more effectively than tobacco taxation. The intuition for
this result is that a decrease in body weight also makes smoking less valuable as a dieting
device, while a decrease in smoking slows down metabolism and reduces the efficiency of
calorie burning.
Nevertheless, our results should be cautiously considered by the policy maker. First, our
model may be interpreted as considering a representative agent, but distributional aspects of
the population could play a role. The strength of reinforcement for smoking and the degree
of interdependence between smoking and eating in preferences may substantially vary across
socio-demographic groups. For example, the category of social smokers, which accounts for
one fourth of the smoking market, is characterized by a mild addiction to smoking and a
reinforcing effect between concurrent smoking and eating. In this case, our results predict
that food taxation can be effective at reducing both smoking and body weight, while tobacco
taxes may have an adverse effect on body weight. The policy maker could then introduce
food taxation only in specific places where the conviviality dimension is more relevant for
social smokers (e.g. bars, restaurants, pubs). Second, food taxes and cigarette taxes are
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both regressive (Philipson and Posner, 2008, Gospodinov and Irvine, 2009, Haavio and Ko-
takorpi, 2011). We have not discussed here the regressive nature of taxation, nor provided a
welfare assessment of the policies. In this respect, the policy maker should take into account
the underlying asymmetry between smoking and eating behavior. Food taxation will impact
the whole population, including thus normal weight individuals, smokers and non-smokers.
Cigarette taxes are effective at curbing smoking consumption among smokers and discourag-
ing smoking initiation, but do not impact non-smokers decisions on eating behavior and may
have positive effects on body weight. Our cautionary message is thus that cigarette taxes
should not be waived or reduced a priori and that the possibility to address two risk factors
with food taxation should be balanced with the greater regressive effects that it may have.
The goal of this paper was to study the interaction between smoking, eating behavior
and body weight over time, and to understand the conditions under which policies aimed at
affecting one health-related behavior may have a different scope than expected. However,
future research could extend this model by introducing choices over physical exercise, junk
and healthy food, addictiveness of food, availability of information, self-control and time-
inconsistency issues, and explicitly modelling social interactions.
Finally, the model we have proposed may be a useful starting point for research on
other interrelated behaviors, which have already been subject of empirical analysis, e.g. use
of multiple drugs, alcohol and tobacco (Bask and Melkersson, 2004), beer and marijuana
(Pacula, 1998). The model can also be broadly applied in settings where the assumption
of intertemporal separability of preferences is too restrictive, as it is the case of behaviors
related to addiction, habit formation, learning-by-doing, and human capital formation.
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A Appendix
A.1 The solution under bounded rationality
Here we study the extreme case in which the agent does not take into account the future
consequences of her current eating and smoking choices on future body weight and addiction
to smoking. In other words, we consider the case where, at each time t, the agent maximizes
(5) given the budget constraint, her current body weight and her current addiction to smoking,
but without taking into account (6) and (7). This case is instructive, because it allows to
determine the optimal solution of an agent that, due to informational or cognitive constraints,
does not consider (or is not able to determine) the rational forward-looking path of choices
that would maximize her intertemporal utility. The agent thus takes into account current
addiction and body weight when choosing the optimal level of smoking and food consumption,
but she ignores that future addiction and body weight will change as a consequence of her
current choices. As shown in the main text, this na¨ıve approach is not optimal for a forward-
looking agent, because it does not allow to take into full consideration how the future evolution
of addiction and body weight will impact on future utility.
Given current body weight and addiction to smoking, the optimal choice of food con-
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sumption and smoking satisfies the following condition
Uc
Us
=
pc
ps
, (16)
which is formally equivalent to the familiar static optimization solution under budget con-
straint where the marginal rate of substitution between two goods equals the ratio of the
corresponding market prices. However, here the solution is not static because the optimal
amount of smoking and eating depends on addiction to smoking and body weight. Since
addiction and body weight change as a consequence of the choices of the agent, they are
going to affect Uc/Us and, consequently, the optimal level of food consumption and smoking
that satisfies (16) will change over time. This process stops when (16) holds and w˙ = a˙ = 0.
Whether this condition is associated to being over- or underweight, or with being on diet or
binging, requires additional specific assumptions. For a forward-looking agent, instead, we
have shown that Uc/Us = pc/ps results in steady state if the agent has a healthy body weight
and is not addicted to smoking.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
It is convenient to express the conditions (8)-(11) as a systems of differential equations where
only control and state variables appear. Differentiating (8) and (9), replacing (10), (11), and
using (8), (9), the following dynamic system results
s˙ =
1
ψ
(AUcs −BUcc) (17)
c˙ =
1
ψ
(BUcs −AUss) (18)
a˙ = s− δa (19)
w˙ = c− εs− δw. (20)
where
A = (δ + ρ) (pc − Uc)− Uw, (21)
B = (δ + ρ) (ps − Us)− Ua + a˙Usa + εUw, (22)
ψ = UccUss − U2cs > 0,
In steady state, conditions (17)-(20) must be equal to zero. Since ψ > 0 holds by assumption,
this implies the following:
Uw = (δ + ρ) (p
c − Uc)
Ua = (δ + ρ) (p
s − Us) + εUw
δwss = css − εsss
δass = sss
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A.3 Asymptotic stability of the steady state
At the steady state, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J of the dynamic system (17)-(20)
are (Dockner, 1985)
e1,2,3,4 =
ρ
2
±
√
ρ2
4
− K
2
± 1
2
√
K2 − 4|J |
where |J | is the determinant of the Jacobian,
|J | = 1
ψ
[(2δ + ρ)Usa + Uaa + δ (δ + ρ)Uss] [δ (δ + ρ)Ucc + Uww]
− 1
ψ
[
δ2 (δ + ρ)2 U2cs − δε (δ + ρ) (εUcc + 2Ucs)Uww
]
, (23)
and
K = −2δ (δ + ρ)− 1
ψ
[(2δ + ρ)Usa + Uaa]Ucc
− 1
ψ
[Uss + ε (εUcc + 2Ucs)]Uww.
After some algebraic manipulations, it can be shown that K2 > 4|J |. The conditions |J | > 0
and K < 0 are sufficient for saddle point stability (Dokner, 1985). The former condition
requires
Usa < −δ (δ + ρ)Uss + Uaa
2δ + ρ
+
δ2 (δ + ρ)2 U2cs − δε (δ + ρ) (εUcc + 2Ucs)Uww
(2δ + ρ) [δ (δ + ρ)Ucc + Uww]
= α1,
the latter requires
Usa <
2δ (δ + ρ)ψ − [Uss + ε (εUcc + 2Ucs)]Uww − UaaUcc
(2δ + ρ)Ucc
= α2.
Hence stability of the steady state requires Usa < min{α1, α2}. Figure 2 is drawn for the case
where α1 < α2, i.e. stability is guaranteed when |J | > 0.
A.4 Increasing the price of smoking
Short-run effect. For given values of the state and costate variables, the instantaneous
reaction to a change in the price of smoking ps is obtained by applying the implicit function
theorem to (8) and (9):
∂s (t)∗
∂ps
=
Ucc
ψ
< 0
∂c (t)∗
∂ps
=
Ucs
ψ
.
This implies that, in the short-run, smoking decreases, while food intake increases if Ucs > 0
and it decreases otherwise.
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Long-run effect. The change in the steady state demand for smoking as a response to
a change in the price of smoking is given by the following expression:
∂sss
∂ps
= −|P ||J | ,
where P is
P =

∂s˙/∂ps ∂s˙/∂c ∂s˙/∂a ∂s˙/∂w
∂c˙/∂ps ∂c˙/∂c ∂c˙/∂a ∂c˙/∂w
∂a˙/∂ps ∂a˙/∂c ∂a˙/∂a ∂a˙/∂w
∂w˙/∂ps ∂w˙/∂c ∂w˙/∂a ∂w˙/∂w
 .
Since the following holds
|P | = −δ (δ + ρ) δ (δ + ρ)Ucc + Uww
ψ
> 0.
and a necessary condition for a stable steady state is that the determinant of the Jacobian
matrix is positive, then
∂sss
∂ps
= δ (δ + ρ)
δ (δ + ρ)Ucc + Uww
ψ|J | < 0.
Similarly, we can compute the change in steady state food consumption and body weight and
obtain:
∂css
∂ps
= δ (δ + ρ)
εUww − δ (δ + ρ)Ucs
ψ|J | (24)
∂wss
∂ps
= −δ (δ + ρ)2 εUcc + Ucs
ψ|J | . (25)
This implies the following:
∂css
∂ps
> 0 ⇔ Ucs < σ1
∂wss
∂ps
> 0 ⇔ Ucs < σ2,
where
σ1 =
ε
δ (δ + ρ)
Uww ≤ 0,
σ2 = −εUcc ≥ 0.
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A.5 Increasing the price of food
Short-run effect. To obtain the instantaneous reaction to a change in the price of food, we
apply the implicit function theorem to (8) and (9):
∂c (t)∗
∂pc
=
Uss
ψ
< 0;
∂s (t)∗
∂pc
=
Ucs
ψ
.
This implies that, in the short-run, food consumption decreases, while smoking increases if
Ucs > 0 and it decreases otherwise.
Long-run effect. In the long-run, the impact of a permanent change in the price of
consumption on food consumption, body weight and smoking is the following:
∂css
∂pc
= δ (δ + ρ)
(2δ + ρ)Usa + Uaa + δ (δ + ρ)Uss + ε
2Uww
ψ|J | (26)
∂wss
∂pc
= (δ + ρ)
(2δ + ρ)Usa + Uaa + δ (δ + ρ)Uss + δε (δ + ρ)Ucs
ψ|J | , (27)
∂sss
∂pc
= δ (δ + ρ)
εUww − δ (δ + ρ)Ucs
ψ|J | . (28)
It can be shown that ∂css/∂pc is always negative when the concavity condition on the utility
function and the necessary condition for stability (|J | > 0) hold. The same is not true for
∂wss/∂pc. When the metabolic effect is non negligible, ε > 0, condition (27) implies:
∂wss
∂pc
> 0 ⇔ Ucs > σ3
where
σ3 = −(2δ + ρ)Usa + Uaa + δ (δ + ρ)Uss
δ (δ + ρ) ε
.
In passing by, note that σ3 = 0 is the bifurcation condition for instability of the steady state
in the Becker and Murphy (1988) model. In the special case where there is no metabolic
effect of smoking (ε = 0), then ∂wss/∂pc = (∂css/∂pc) /δ < 0. Finally, condition (28) implies
∂sss
∂pc
> 0 ⇔ Ucs < σ1.
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